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BOOK REVIEW
FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION. By Paul J.
Hartman. Rochester, N.Y. and San Francisco, Cal.: The Lawyers
Co-operative Publishing Co. and Bancroft-Whitney Co., 1981. Pp.
xii, 743.
Reviewed by William R. Andersen*
The extent of the states' power to tax interstate business has
been hotly disputed since the beginning of the Republic, and the
role of the courts in resolving the question has been central. Chief
Justice Marshall, arguing in 1819 for limited state taxing power,
wrote, "[T]he power to tax involves the power to destroy."1 More
than 100 years later, Justice Holmes, advocating a more expansive
state taxing power, countered Marshall's position, saying, "The
power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."12
Today, judicial extension of state taxing power is accelerating. In-
deed, one leading scholar has called the current movement in state
and local taxation of interstate business "potentially revolution-
ary."M Amid the "revolution," lawyers and judges need a work that
carefully traces the historical path of this movement and serves as
a reliable guide for its future. Federal Limitations on State and
Local Taxation by Paul J. Hartman is such a work.
In addition, serious students of government will find in this
work a richly documented history of one of the major battlefields
in the growth of American federalism. Hartman's work begins with
a discussion of the early "free trade" notion adopted by federalist
judges such as Chief Justice Marshall who feared destruction of
interstate activity by strong state governments. The doctrine de-
veloped by these judges greatly restricted state power to tax inter-
state activities. The story proceeds to the nineteenth century when
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. B.S., 1954, LL.B., 1956, University of
Denver; LL.M., 1958, Yale University.
1. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
2. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).




the courts recognized the importance of growing interstate com-
merce and the legitimacy of state revenue needs. The shift in the
courts' view expanded the reach of state taxing power, a movement
that continues today. Although this trend has not been without ir-
regularities and reversals, it has continued unmistakably-even
within the last two to three years.
In discussing these developments, Hartman uses an unusual
organizational structure. The first chapters of the book are organ-
ized around legal doctrine-in this field that means discussion of
constitutional clauses and their judicial interpretation. Beginning
with chapter seven, the organizational focus shifts from legal doc-
trine to types of taxes. The reader, therefore, gets a sort of cross-
grained organization in which he sees the most fundamental issues
twice, first in a doctrinal discussion and later in a setting that fo-
cuses on the peculiarities of the tax instrument involved. While
this approach inevitably results in some duplication, it is not repe-
titious. Hartman uses the changing organizational focus to high-
light different aspects of the subject.
The analysis begins with a consideration of the commerce
clause and due process doctrines. Hartman discusses the Marshall
court's "free trade" doctrine and its struggle to protect infant en-
terprise from powerful states. By the mid-nineteenth century, the
Court permitted some expansion of state tax power by adopting
the "direct-indirect" test: the Court upheld state taxes which had
only "indirect" effects on interstate commerce. This doctrine's
emphasis on the taxing statute's language and drafting created
what Hartman calls "decades of distinctions based upon insubstan-
tial and pointless formalism."' This highly formalistic view pre-
vailed with a minor digression between 1937 and 19457 -until the
1970's when substantial erosion began.
In Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,8 a 1977 opinion, the
Court seems to have entered an era in which decisions turn on the
practical economic effects of the tax rather than its formal statu-
tory phrasing. The test-for both commerce and due process doc-
4. While these two doctrines protect somewhat different values--the commerce clause
seeks to protect interstate activity and the due process clause seeks fairness to taxpay-
ers-Hartman treats them here together because the Court commonly does so.
5. P. HARTMAN, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LocAL TAXATION § 2:13 (1981).
6. Id. at 88.
7. Essentially the period between Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250 (1938) and Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946).
8. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
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trines-now turns in a real sense on matters such as whether the
connection between the taxed activity and the state is sufficient to
make the imposition of the tax fair, whether the benefits received
by the taxpayer are fairly related to the tax, whether the tax in
effect discriminates against the interstate business, and whether
the tax is apportioned fairly. Several later opinions of the Court
have reinforced this new practical view of the validity of state
taxes levied on both interstate0 and foreign"' commerce. For al-
most thirty years, Hartman has argued for this pragmatic,
nonformal approach.1 2 One guesses that this chapter was a plea-
sure for him to write.
The equal protection clause which Hartman discusses next,
has not significantly limited states' power to tax interstate activi-
ties. The Court adopted early the notion that the clause did not
require an "iron rule of equal taxation. ' 13 Since that time, heavy
presumptions in favor of classification schemes have doomed most
taxpayer equal protection claims. A court is simply not likely to
respond favorably to these complaints when it is willing to pre-
sume that the classification "though discriminatory, is not. . . vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. . . if any state of facts rea-
sonably can be conceived that would sustain it."
14
Hartman also sees expansion of the state taxing power in re-
cent decisions under the privileges and immunities clauses. The
book focuses on the article IV clause, which allows a state to dis-
criminate against nonresidents only when valid independent state
objectives are rationally related to the statutory scheme. The
Court judges the validity of these objectives and the adequacy of
their relation to the challenged statutory scheme "with due regard
for the principle that the States should have considerable leeway
in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures."1 5
Again, the latter day movement in the direction of expanding state
taxing power is evident. Recent decisions under the clause have
sought to limit its protection to privileges and immunities that are
"fundamental" in the sense that they preserve "the vitality of the
9. P. HARTMAN, supra note 5, at 91.
I0. Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S.
734 (1978).
I1. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
12. See P. HARTMAN, STATE TAXATON OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE (1953).
13. Bell's Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890).
14. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 528 (1959) (emphasis added).
15. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
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Nation."" Whether a doctrinal formula cast in an elusive term like
"funadmental" will prove any more useful here than it has else-
where remains to be seen. Hartman concludes that on balance the
current movement is sound. He finds in the inevitable unclarity of
the word "fundamental" a desirable judicial "latitude in weighing
the legitimate interests of the taxing State and nonresidents in a
flexible application of the ... clause."
1 7
Hartman's discussion of the export/import cases illustrates the
same pattern of limiting constitutional protections and expanding
state taxing power. Hartman's historical treatment shows the de-
velopment of the early doctrine that limited the states' ability to
tax imports still in their "original package" and the abandonment
of that test in 197618 in favor of a simple ban on discrimination.
Similarly, in the state taxation of exports, the Court introduced a
doctrine that required determining when the "stream of com-
merce" began, permitting states to tax only prior to that point. In
1978, the Court abandoned that approach in favor of a more prac-
tical inquiry into the purposes of the clause. 19
The final "doctrinal" section of the book examines in some de-
tail the "implied immunity" from state taxation that federal activi-
ties have enjoyed. 20 The federal immunity expanded during the pe-
riod between 1840 and 1940, but has gradually narrowed since
James v. Dravo Contracting Co.2 1 in 1937. Dravo Contracting ar-
ticulated the "legal incidence" theory, which effectively allows the
states to impose the economic burdens of a tax on federal activities
so long as the legal incidence of the tax is not laid on the federal
government. As Professor Powell trenchantly noted, the determi-
native inquiry is "not 'who is hurt, but who is hit.' "22 Unlike the
movement in other areas toward more practical and less formal
tests, this doctrine still stresses legalisms rather than economic ef-
fects. While be concedes that the implied immunity will survive for
16. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
17. P. HARTmAN, supra note 5, at 186.
18. Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
19. See, e.g., Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring Cos.,
435 U.S. 734 (1978).
20. Hartman traces the history of both elements of the doctrine-the implied immu-
nity of federal activities and the constitutional power of Congress to regulate commerce. See
P. HARTMAN, supra note 5, ch. 6.
21. 302 U.S. 134 (1937).




some time,23 Hartman perceives little logical necessity for it. Con-
gress, he suggests, can provide for those few situations in which
conflicting local taxes would place burdens on interstate activities.
At this point in the book, the organizational focus shifts to
types of taxes. Chapter seven deals with state property taxes on
goods and vehicles moving in interstate and foreign commerce. The
chapter includes a discussion of apportionment and valuation
problems. Chapter eight discusses the development of the gross re-
ceipts tax from Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue2 4
through Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair.2 5 The Court's deci-
sions relating to both of these taxes illustrate again the current
expansion of the states' taxing power.
Chapter nine treats the net income tax, which provides such a
large portion of state revenue today.28 The special fairness claims
of this tax-there is no tax if there is no net income-perhaps ex-
plain why it was one of the first taxes that the Court permitted on
an exclusively interstate business.27 Congress has tried to limit the
reach of state power to tax net income of interstate business, 28 but
its efforts have produced much uncertainty. Hartman's discusson
of the case law here is very helpful.
Division of income remains a particularly difficult problem.
The text discusses the uniform act2' and the Multistate Tax Com-
pact"0 as well as Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair,3 1 Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes,32 and Exxon Corp. v. Depart-
ment of Revenue.3 The Court is moving unmistakeably in the di-
rection of greater latitude for the states and less immunity for in-
terstate commerce. Indeed, the sharpness of the dissents
corroborates the velocity of this movement.
Discussion of the sales and use taxes in chapter ten reviews
the plentiful litigation resulting from states seeking to tax inter-
state sales of goods. While courts have expanded state power to tax
23. P. HARTMAN, supra note 5, at 339.
24. 303 U.S. 250 (1938).
25. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
26. Hartman discusses both personal and corporate income taxes.
27. Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
28. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-272, 73 Stat. 555 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 381-384 (1976)).
29. UNIFORM DIVISION OF INCOME FOR TAX PuRPosEs ACT, 7A U.L.A. 91 (1957).
30. MULTISTATE TAx COMPACT, reprinted in 1 ST. & Loc. TAx SERV. (P-H), ALL
STATES UNIT 1 6310 (Apr. 22, 1975).
31. 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
32. 445 U.S. 425 (1980).
33. 447 U.S. 207 (1980).
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these sales, significant limits still remain. The determinative issue
is whether McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co.84 is still sound law. Mc-
Leod held that a state could not tax an interstate sale to one of its
residents, even though the goods were shipped into the taxing state
and the seller's traveling salesman solicited the sale in the taxing
state. Hartman believes Dilworth still lives and argues that even
under the modern view of Complete Auto Transit 5 some "nexus"
must exist between the taxing state and the sale-a requirement
not met if the seller does nothing but send in traveling salesmen.3
6
Perhaps the availability of the use tax, however, has made liti-
gation of the Dilworth point unnecessary-the taxing state can tax
a resident for the privilege of using the property puchased in an
interstate sale even when the state cannot reach the sale itself. For
many kinds of property, therefore, the availability of the use tax
makes irrelevant the inability to reach the sale directly. Of course,
not all property subject to the use tax can be identified readily by
the taxing state. The identification problem has led to efforts by
the taxing state to require the out-of-state seller to collect the tax-
ing state's use tax at the time of sale. The questions here involve
the degree and nature of the out-of-state seller's contacts with the
taxing state. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Reve-
nue3 7 held that when the seller only solicits by mail-order catalog
in the taxing state, the seller has insufficient contact with that
state to warrant imposing on the seller the duty to collect the use
tax. On the other hand, National Geographic Society v. California
Board of Equalization3 8 permitted imposition of the duty when
the out-of-state seller had offices in the taxing state even though
the offices had no relationship to the sale. The Court, thus does
not require a "transactional" nexus, only "'some definite link.' ,,39
Clearly preferring the generosity of the National Geographic ap-
proach, Hartman wonders why the clear economic presence of the
out-of-state seller in Bellas Hess should not have been
recognized.40
After a chapter on capital stock taxes and one on exactions for
34. 322 U.S. 327 (1944).
35. 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
36. See P. HARTMAN, supra note 5, at 597.
37. 386 U.S. 753 (1967).
38. 430 U.S. 551 (1977).
39. P. HARTMAN, supra note 5, at 635 (quoting National Geographic Soc'y v. California
Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 561 (1977)).
40. See id. at 631.
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the use of public facilities, Hartman concludes with a chapter spec-
ulating whether recent opinions such as National League of Cities
v. Usery"4 signal some limit on congressional power over state and
local taxation. He concludes that while Justice Rehnquist's Usery
opinion has sufficient elasticity to permit classifying state tax
structures as "traditional ways in which the local governments
have arranged their affairs"42-a classification that would immu-
nize these activities from federal power under Usery-the Court
nevertheless has sent more recent signals reasserting federal
power.48 Hartman believes Usery "will [not] appreciably change
the design of the power of Congress to control state and local
taxation."
' 4
Federal Limitations on State and Local Taxation presents a
central question about how usefully and how legitimately courts
have dealt with the issues of state taxing powers. The United
States Supreme Court has assumed a role as the principal architect
of this component of federalism. State legislatures and tax officials
have, of course, played roles, but they have always operated under
the shadow of judicial doctrine. While Congress has not been whol-
ly inactive, its role has been derivative, interstitial, and hesitant.
Perhaps Congress' fact-finding role has been larger than its legisla-
tive role.'5
Some federal role, of course, is needed to police state taxing
activities, since many persons and businesses affected by these
state taxes have no representation in the legislature of the taxing
state. The importance of representation, however, does not explain
why the judicial branch had to be so predominant in the federal
role. Historical factors may explain the Court's early role in state
taxation disputes. The first Chief Justice, an ardent Federalist, not
surprisingly made it the business of the Court to help solidify the
power of the central government. The reasons for the continuation
of this pervasive judicial role are less apparent. Perhaps the Court
believes that these conflicts are better decided on a case-by-case
basis-a better job for courts than legislatures. Moreover, congres-
sional attempts to regulate this conflict may encounter an inherent
41. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
42. Id. at 849.
43. See, e.g., Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978).
44. P. HARTMAN, supra note 5, at 704.
45. See the so-called Willis Report, H.R. REP. No. 1480, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964);
H.R. REP. No. 565, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. REP. No. 952, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965).
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structural difficulty: the representational structure of the Con-
gress-especially in the Senate-may make congressional restraint
of the important interests of any one state unlikely.
Whatever the reasons for the tradition of judicial intervention
in this area, the recent movement of the Court in the direction of
expanding state power and reducing the constitutional constraints
on state taxation will have the inevitable effect of reducing the ju-
dicial involvement. Recent decisions have returned a great deal of
discretion to state and federal legislatures. Whether this trend will
continue remains uncertain. Professor Hartman's work provides
valuable assistance in resolving the ambiguities that have arisen
because of the changing views of the Court.
